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The History, Application, and Policy of the
Judicially Created Standards of Review for
Arbitration Awards

Arbitration, intended to reduce federal court caseload,' is
producing a n increased amount of litigation. The proper standard for review of arbitration awards continues to be a puzzle
to litigants, and to some extent to the judiciary. Much of the
confusion can be traced to two conflicting federal policies. On
the one hand, both Congress and federal courts support arbitration as one method of relieving oppressive caseloads. Therefore,
to promote the finality of arbitration, courts generally defer to
the arbitrator's determination of the merits of a n award. For a
court to review the merits would reduce arbitration from a n
efficient, private means of resolving disputes to a mere prelitigation formality.
On the other hand, absolute deference is inappropriate.
The Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States
in the federal c o ~ r t s not
, ~ in arbitrators. Therefore, federal
courts should review the merits when arbitration awards impinge on the judicial power. For example, courts have the responsibility to represent the general public interest and cannot
permit a violation of public policy, enforce illegal contracts, or
otherwise condone illegal behavior. Therefore, arbitration
awards violating public policy or the law require federal court
review.
Enacted in 1925, the United States Arbitration Act ("Act")3
provides four broad standards under which an arbitration
award may be ~ a c a t e d Section
.~
ten of the Act "authorizes va-

1. As one federal circuit court noted, the goal of arbitration is "to relieve
congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for
dispute resolution that would be speedier and less costly than litigation."
Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981).
2.
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . establish." U.S.
CONST.art. 111, § 1.
3.
9 U.S.C. $9 1-14 (1988).
4.
9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West Supp. 1992) provides in part:
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catur of an award in cases of specified misconduct or misbehavior on the arbitrators' part, actions in excess of arbitral
powers, or failures to consummate the award."' In addition to
these statutory standards, the federal judiciary has formulated
other standards under which arbitration awards may be vacated.
The purpose of this comment is to identify these judicially
created standards and to analyze their history, application, and
underlying policies. Federal courts, implementing a policy that
favors arbitration, have applied these standards in an unnecessarily formalistic and narrow manner. This comment addresses
each of the current standards-essence of the contract, manifest disregard of the law, illegality, and public policy-and
concludes that, in order to promote arbitration, federal courts
should adopt a broader, more rational approach to reviewing
arbitration awards.
OF THE CONTRACT
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
11. THE ESSENCE

A. Historical Background
The standard of review most often used for arbitration
awards, the "essence of the contract" standard, was established
by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Gorp? In that case, a group of employees was

(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
Detailed discussion of these statutory grounds is beyond the scope of this comment.
For an excellent review, see Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation, Construction and
Application of $ 10(a-d) of United States Arbitration Act of 1947 (9 USCS # 1Wadl), Providing Grounds for Vacating Arbitration Awards, 20 A.L.R. FED: 295 (1986).
5.
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
6.
363 U.S. 593 (1960). Enterprise Wheel is one of three related cases decided
the same day that are known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. The other two cases are
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fired for walking off the job to protest the discharge of another
employee.' The collective bargaining agreement between the
union and the employer provided that any disagreements "as to
the meaning and application" of the contract should be submitted to final, binding arbitration.' The arbitrator reinstated the
workers after a ten day suspension but the employer refused to
comply with the award.g Upon the union's motion to enforce
the award, the district court directed the employer to comply.
The court of appeals, however, vacated the award.''
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[tlhe refusal of
courts to review the merits of a n arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements."" The arbitrator has authority to interpret and apply
the contract, the parties having bargained for his "informed
judgment" regarding the "knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular factory or of a particular industry."12 The
Court recognized only a narrow exception to the finality of a n
arbitration award.
[Aln arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course
look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest
an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to
refuse enforcement of the award.13

In short, this deferential standard of review, intended to support the federal policy favoring labor arbitration, forbids courts

United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (holding that a
t
on the merits of the grievance if the parties have agreed to
court c a ~ o rule
submit a dispute to arbitration in their collective bargaining agreement), and
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (establishing a presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes if the collective bargaining
agreement contains an arbitration clause).
7.
363 U.S. at 595.
8. Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
9.
10. Id. at 595-96. The collective bargaining agreement expired before the award
was issued. The court of appeals vacated the award because the reinstatement and
the award of back pay could not be enforced. Id.
11. Id. at 596.
12. Id. at 596-97.
13. Id. at 597.
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from overturning awards arising out of the essence of the underlying contract.

B. Application
The essence of the contract standard has been applied
frequently over the years. Most notably, the Supreme Court
expressly reaffirmed the standard in United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco, Inc. l4 In Misco, the employer
appealed an arbitrator's reinstatement of a discharged employeel5 and the district court vacated the award on the ground
that it violated public policy; the court of appeals afErmed.16
In a discussion reminiscent of Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme
Court reversed, once again asserting that the arbitrator's role
in labor disputes is essentially one of a contract-reader. The
Court reasoned that arbitral decisions are insulated from judicial review because the parties bargained for "the arbitrator's
view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract."" The
Court concluded that because the parties have "authorized the
arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement,"
the fact that the arbitrator "misread" the contract establishes
no ground on which the awaxd can be set aside?
The lower courts have developed numerous variations of
the essence of the contract standard. These variations set aside
an award if it is "completely irrati~nal,"'~
"unfounded in reason and fact,"20 "arbitrary and caprici~us,"~~
"palpably

14.
484 U.S. 29 (1987).
Id. a t 34.
15.
16.
Id. a t 34-35. For a more detailed analysis of Misco and the public policy
exception, see infra part V.
17.
Id. at 37-38.
18.
Id. a t 38. The Court explained:
[Ilnterpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its essence
from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator's own notions of
industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,
that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to
overturn his decision.
Id.
19.
French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Femer & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906
(9th Cir. 1986).
20.
United Food & Commercial Workers v. Stop & Shop Co., 776 F.2d 19, 21
(1st Cir. 1985). In this case the court said that an arbitration award may be set
aside if it is "(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably
faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably have made such a
ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-
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faulty,"22 not "plausible ,"23 or in "[mlanifest disregard of the
law."24 Whatever label applied, the vast majority of disputed
arbitration awards are affirmed under the essence of the contract st a ~ ~ d a r d . ~ ~

C. Analysis
Seven years before Misco, one scholar asserted that reviewing courts all too oRen explore the merits of arbitral interpretation despite the Supreme Court's clear mandate in Enterprise
Wheel that courts not pass on the merits of arbitration
awards.26He noted that we do not need "more verbal formulations of the proper scope of review," but rather a return to a
fact." Id.
Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fewer & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412
21.
(11th Cir. 1990).
International Elec. Workers v. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 489 F.2d 768,
22.
769 (1st Cir. 1973); Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers
Int'l Union, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968).
Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery Workers Int'l Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th
23.
Cir. 1969).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933
24.
(2d. Cir. 1986) (In addition to other standards, an arbitration award may be set
aside if it is in "[mlanifest disregard of the law.").
The "manifest disregard of the law" standard is included in this list because
many courts regard it as merely a variation of the essence of the contract standard. However, the two standards are different in many important respects. While
essence of the contract is used to determine whether the arbitrator is construing
the contract, manifest disregard of the law refers to the arbitrator's failure to rely
on outside, governing law. See infra part 111.
Courts have reasoned that these various formulations of the standard can be
reduced to some sort of abuse of discretion standard. See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy,
914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We regard the standard of review undergirding
these various formulations as identical . . . ."); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[Sleveral . . . terms of art have been
employed to ensure that the arbitrator's decision relies on his interpretation of the
contract as contrasted with his own beliefs of fairness and justice.").
25.
Ladish Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 966
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
Regardless of the label applied, the general rule stands that an arbitrator may
not ignore the plain language of the contract. Though most arbitration awards are
affirmed under the essence of the contract standard, courts in a small group of
cases have vacated awards that were contrary to the plain language of the contract. E.g., AP Parts Co. v. UAW, 923 F.2d 488, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1991) (ignoring
the plain language of the contract, the arbitrator "dired[ed] the parties to negotiate again what they had settled" in previous contract talks); Leed Architectural
Prods., Inc. v. United Steelworkers Local 6674, 916 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir. 1990)
("arbitrator disregarded . . . the contract" by allowing an unlawful wage rate to
stand and altering the bargained-for rate of other employees to match).
26.
Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM.L. REV. 267, 270-74 (1980).
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more clear understanding of the basics: the role of the arbitraThe various verbal formulations of the Enterprise Wheel
standard are both unnecessary and confusing. Without a clear
recognition that these standards stem from the same source,
they expand the grounds for vacating an award, thereby increasing the possibility that a judge will, in fact, review the
merits of an award. But most important, these formulations
distract the judiciary from the essential question of the
arbitrator's function and from the purpose underlying judicial
deference to arbitration awards. These considerations should
ultimately control any decision regarding the proper scope of
review for arbitration awards. Fortunately, many courts are not
misled and seem to recognize that all of these verbal formulations refer to the same standard.28
Nevertheless, some ambiguity exists even after Misco's
affirmation of the Enterprise Wheel standard. As the Sixth
Circuit recently noted, literal application of the Misco standard
may lead to the absurd result that an arbitration award not
interpreting or relying on the contract may nonetheless be
insulated from review, so long as the arbitrator was "arguably
construing or applying the contract."2g Because "arguably" is
an extremely broad term, nearly all decisions by arbitrators
can be said to have some basis in the ~ontract.~'
A more narrow reading of Misco is therefore required, not only to effectuate the parties' chosen method of dispute resolution, but to
ensure that courts still have the power to set aside an award
that reflects the arbitrator's "own brand of industrial justi~e."~'
The Sixth Circuit has suggested a two-step inquiry when
determining whether an award is "arguably" based on the contract. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the
arbitrator interpreted or applied a specific term of the contract.
If not, then the award is not arguably drawn from the "essence"
of the contract and cannot be enforced. Second, if the

27.
Id. at 274.
See supra note 24.
28.
29.
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 984, No. 905933, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 24760, at *13 (6th Cir. O d . 10, 1991) (emphasis
added) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
Id.
30.
31.
Id. at *14 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 36 (quoting United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))).
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arbitrator's interpretation of the contract is arguably
then even the reviewing court's belief that the arbitrator has
"committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his deci~ i o n . "The
~ ~ Sixth Circuit's approach confines arbitrators to
the terms of the contract and allows for a judicial check on
arbitrator "industrial justice." Moreover, this approach is easily
applied and supports arbitral finality.
111. THE MANIFESTDISREGARDOF THE LAW
STANDARD
OF REVIEW

A. Historical Background
Although some federal circuit courts maintain that the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard is nothing more than
a verbal variation of the Enterprise Wheel "essence of the contract" standard,34in reality, each is a n independent standard
of review. While the Enterprise Wheel standard applies to the
arbitrator's interpretation of the contract, the manifest disregard of the law standard relates to the arbitrator's interpretation and application of the governing law outside the agreement.
The "manifest disregard" standard originated from dicta in
the 1953 Supreme Court decision Wilko v. Swan.35 In Wilko
the Court declared invalid the use of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in securities agreements, primarily because of "the old judicial hostility to a r b i t r a t i ~ n . "The
~ ~ Wilko Court was uncomfortable with arbitration of security disputes under federal law
because arbitrators lack "judicial instruction on the law,"
awards may be made without explanation or a complete record
of the arbitration proceedings, and "[plower to vacate a n award
is limited."37The Court noted the following in dicta:
While it may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to
decide in accordance with [applicable law] would "constitute
grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section ten of the
Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to be made

32.
Id. at *13.
33.
Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
34.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
35.
346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
36.
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d
Cir. 1942).
37.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
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clearly t o appear. . . . [TJhe interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject,
in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretati~n.~~

Although the Supreme Court later reversed Wilko to allow
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in securities contracts, the
"manifest disregard" language remains influential. Applying
this standard, many circuit courts have determined that the
arbitrators must "understand and correctly state the law, but
proceed to disregard the same" before a court can review the
award on the merits.39 But the most often cited formulation of
the manifest disregard standard originated in the Second Circuit. There, the court stated that to meet this standard requires more than a mere misunderstanding with respect to the
law:
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to
serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies
that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.40

Citing the Steelworkers Trilogy:' the Second Circuit noted
that the well-established federal policy favoring arbitration
required the adoption of this strict formulation of the manifest
disregard of the law ~ t a n d a r d . ~ '

B. Application
Courts are extremely reluctant to vacate a n award because
of allegations that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law." In the name of judicial deference to arbitration awards,

38.
Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
39.
See, e-g., Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc.{ 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th
Cir.) (quoting San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd.,
293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
40.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, F e ~ e r& Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d
Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit has adopted virtually the same standard, stating that
it requires a "willful unattentiveness to the governing law." Jenkins v. PrudentialBache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988).
41.
See supra note 6.
42.
Bobker, 808 F.2d a t 933.
43.
The author has yet to find a case where an arbitration award was vacated
because the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law as presently defined. See
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the federal circuits have erected a virtually insurmountable
standard of review. Before a court can review the propriety of
a n award, there must be a showing that the arbitrator first
correctly ascertained the applicable law and then expressly
manifested a n intention, on the record, to disregard it. This
requires the party moving to vacate the award to make a twopart showing. First, the party must show on the record that the
arbitrator correctly ascertained the applicable law. This often
proves impossible because arbitrators are not required to give
reasons, let alone legal analysis, justifying an award.44 A failure to make the showing is fatal. In O.R. Securities, Inc. v.
Professional Planning Asso~iates,4~
Professional Planning Associates entered into binding arbitration to resolve a dispute
with WZW Financial Services, Inc. (WZW). Soon thereafter,
WZW transferred its assets to O.R. Securities (O.R.), whose
attempt to avoid the arbitration failed.46 After losing at arbitration, O.R. filed suit in federal court to vacate the award,
claiming that it had not assumed WZWs liabilitiese4' The
court held that because the arbitrators failed to provide any
explanation of their award, O.R. could not make a showing that
the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law?
Second, assuming a party seeking vacatur of a n award can
prove the arbitrators correctly ascertained the applicable law,
the party must also show that the arbitrator's express intention
to disregard it. As the O.R.Securities court explained, "there
must be some showing in the record, other than the result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly disregarded it."49Due t o the inherent difficulty in proving arbitral
intent, it is not surprising that few, if any, arbitration awards
have been vacated under the manifest disregard standard.50
Shulenberger, supra note 4, a t 367 (arbitration awards generally not vacated under
manifest disregard of the law).
44.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960) (arbitrators are not required to give reasons for award); Sobel v. Hertz,
Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972) (arbitrators are not required
to explain award).
45.
857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988).
Id. a t 744.
46.
Id.
47.
48.
Id. at 747. Likewise, in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d
743 (8th Cir. 1986), the court refused to find that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law because the arbitration award "does not clearly delineate the law
applied, nor expound the reasoning and analysis used." Id. a t 750.
49.
857 F.2d a t 747 (emphasis added).
50.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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C. Analysis
The current formulation of the manifest disregard of the
law standard of judicial review actually promotes disregard of
the applicable law, lacks any potency whatsoever, and undermines rather than supports the federal policy favoring arbitration.
The present doctrine does little more than provide an incentive for arbitrators t o disregard the law, especially when the
arbitrator is not a lawyer. In effect, when arbitrators are faced
with the application of governing law outside the contract, they
can avoid any complicated legal analysis by ignoring the issue
altogether. As long as they are careful not to give any reasons
for the award, their actions will receive absolute deference and
never be questioned.
Although some judicial review is necessary to prevent arbitrators from disregarding the law, the federal circuit courts
have defined the applicable standard out of existence. Surely, if
an arbitrator were to ascertain the law, expressly manifest on
the record an intention to ignore it, and do so, the award could
be vacated on statutory grounds.51The present judicial formulation of the standard, then, is meaningless.
The current application of the manifest disregard standard
also ignores the underlying policy consideration of the arbitration system. Ironically, courts consistently point out that the
underlying reason for applying this overly deferential standard
of review is the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. To
adopt a less strict standard, reasoned one circuit court, would
. ~ ~ so, the current standard reducundermine a r b i t r a t i ~ nEven
es the legitimacy of the arbitration system because it erects an
insurmountable barrier to judicial review of arbitration decisions that may completely disregard applicable law, whether
statutory or case law. Public trust and confidence in the arbitral system are essential to achieve the goal of relieving congestion in the courts.53 Therefore, courts should determine
51.
An expressed intention on the record to disregard the law could show "corruption, fraud," "evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators" or that they
"exceeded their powers." 9 U.S.C.A. 8 10(a)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1992).
52.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, F e ~ e r& Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d
Cir. 1986).
53.
This is especially true in the context of commercial arbitration as opposed
to labor arbitration. Whereas an employer generally waives its right to judicial
process in return for a union's promise not to strike, the private litigant does not
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whether the current standard of review actually enhances public confidence in the system, thereby increasing the number of
disputes resolved privately.
Until the judiciary and Congress realize that the standards
of review afforded arbitration affect its very legitimacy, we are
left with a private dispute resolution system clearly inferior to
litigation. Recognizing this fact, the Eighth Circuit gave "notice" to future litigants that "the arbitration system is an inferior system of justice, structured without due process, rules of
evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law."54 The
Eighth Circuit concluded that "the courts are not equipped" to
these review arbitration awards.55

IV. THE ILLEGALITY
STANDARDOF REVIEW

A. Historical Background
The standards of illegality and public policy overlap a great
deal and are often grouped together by the courts. The Supreme Court recently suggested that the two standards exist
independently. "A court's refusal to enforce a n arbitrator's
award . . . because it is contrary to public policy is a specific
application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common
law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate
law or public
The Court explained further that the
doctrine stems from the dual concepts that courts will not aid
any party in committing a n "immoral or illegal act," and that
the judiciary represents the interests of the p u b l i ~ . ~ '
Each standard is independent to some extent. The illegality standard is concerned with whether the underlying contract
or the award violates the law; the public policy standard, on
the other hand, deals with whether enforcing the award would
somehow violate the public's interests. Analyzing the illegality
and public policy standards and their respective underlying
policies separately may help to clarify the judiciary's role i n
reviewing arbitration awards.

receive the same kind of benefit for waiving this right. Stroh Container Co. v.
Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743,'751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id.
54.
55.
Id.
56.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
57.
Id.
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B. Application
Cases in which a n award has been vacated because it violates the law can be grouped into three categories: (1) cases in
which the arbitrator has applied an incorrect legal standard;
(2) cases in which the underlying contract was made in violation of the law; and (3) awards that compel a violation of the
law.
The first category of cases consists of situations in which
the arbitrator applies an incorrect legal standard. Although the
Supreme Court has stated that federal courts are not allowed
to reverse an arbitrator's award based on legal errors,58 a few
circuit courts seem to hold that some egregious legal errors
actually violate the law.
The most illustrative case in this group, Broadway Cab
Cooperative, Inc. v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs Local Union No.
281 t9involved arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
arbitrator violated "law and public policy" by using the rule of
estoppel to "thwart the purposes of a statute of the United
States?' In doing so, the arbitrator applied "an incorrect
legal standard" and contradicted a n "explicit mandate of the
Supreme Court."' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[a] con-

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (holding that arbitrators' legal
58.
interpretations are not subject to judicial review), overruled on other grounds,
Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsodAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
Most circuit courts have followed suit. O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning
Assoc., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that "[clourts are
generally prohibited from vacating an arbitration award on the basis of errors of
law or interpretation"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d
930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring more for vacatur than "error or misunderstanding with respect to the law"); Office of Supply, Republic of Korea v. New York
Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that "[aln award will not
be set aside because of an error on the part of the arbitrators in their interpretation of the law").
59.
710 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1983). For another interesting case, see General
Telephone Co. v. Local 1635, 427 F. Supp. 398 (W.D.Pa. 1977), where the court
vacated an award that held unlawful, and therefore unenforceable, a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement that denied sick pay benefits for absence due to
pregnancy. The arbitrator, the court noted, went outside the agreement to make
the determination, relying on current case law that had recently been overruled by
the Supreme Court. Id. at 399.
60.
Broadway Cab, 710 F.2d at 1384.
61.
Id. The arbitrator, in deciding whether certain sub-contractors were "employees" under the "hot-cargo" provisions of the National Labor Relations Ad,
relied on principles of estoppel rather than the common law agency test. Id. at
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trary holding might discourage arbitration because employers
would be less likely to submit issues to an arbitrator if they
knew that he could disregard the merits of a legal argument
that a district court would be forced to c o n ~ i d e r . "The
~ ~ court
also noted that only where the arbitrator applies the correct
legal standard is his decision subject to the limited review announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy.63
Similarly, the Second Circuit recently upheld a n arbitration award that the district court modified to conform with the
federal post-judgment interest rate statute in Carte Blanche
(Singapore) v. Carte Blanch International, Ltd.64 Noting that
its power to review awards is "narrowly circumscribed" by
current case law,65 the court nevertheless concluded that the
district court's modification of the arbitration award was correct?
The second category of cases involves situations in which
the underlying collective bargaining agreement or contract is
illegal. Although very few cases fall into this category, it nevertheless represents a problematic area not addressed by the
Arbitration Act. The underlying rationale of the illegality standard of review is that courts have the ultimate responsibility to
refuse to enforce illegal contracts, a duty that is not diminished
even when illegal contracts are presented to the court in the
context of arbitration awards.
In Botany Industries, Inc. u. New York Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing worker^,^' the district court vacated a n ar1381. The Supreme Court had recently held that in interpreting the "hot-cargo"
provision, courts must apply the common law agency test and expressly foreclosed
the use of the estoppel principles used by the arbitrator. Id. at 1384.
62.
Id. a t 1384.
Id.
63.
888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1989).
64.
65.
Id. at 265,
Id. a t 270. The court did not specify which doctrine of review it used to
66.
uphold the modification, perhaps because only three years earlier the same court,
in a similar case, refused to review an award because the arbitrator had not
manifestly disregarded the law. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, F e ~ e r& Smith, Inc. v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). Had the circui$ court applied the manifest disregard of the law standard as restrictively as it had in the former case,
Carte Blanche would surely have been decided differently. Bobker suggests that,
short of manifest disregard of the law, courts should give absolute deference to
arbitrators' interpretations of the law. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text. Nothing in Carte. Blanche suggests that any party made such a showing.
67.
375 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated as m o t sub nom. Robb v. New
York Bd. of Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974) (vacating the decision due to the bankruptcy of one of the parties).
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bitration award because the underlying collective bargaining
agreement, not the award itself, violated the law. The court
avoided the issue of judicial deference to arbitration awards by
carefully pointing out that it was not reviewing the merits of
the award-the arbitrator's construction of the contract. Rather, the court was "actually concerned with the lawfulness of its
enforcing the award."6s Turning to basic contract law, the
court focused on the fundamental doctrine that "a contract
made in violation of a statute is
and held that the underlying collective bargaining agreement violated the "hot-cargo" provision of the National Labor Relations Act.?' In so holding, the court reasoned that "[ilf the agreement is void, it is not
legitimized by the arbitral process; and if the agreement is
unenforceable, it is not rendered enforceable by an arbitrator's
decision. Simply stated, the court cannot enforce an invalid
collective bargaining agreement, either directly . . . or indirectly, by enforcement of the award."?'
In Jackson Purchase Rural Electric Cooperative Ass'n u.
Local Union 816, International Brotherhood of Electrical Worke r ~ , the
? ~ employer unilaterally discontinued its long-standing
practice of deducting union dues from employee paychecks.
Although the collective bargaining agreement was silent on the
issue of withholding of union dues, the union filed a grievance
and the arbitrator ordered the employer to continue to withhold
the dues upon obtaining the necessary employee authorizat i ~ n . ?Withholding
~
union dues without employee authorization is illegal under federal law.74The court of appeals invalidated the arbitrator's award because it was based on an illegal
implied contract. In a discussion similar to that in Botany Industries, the court reasoned that "a promise is unenforceable if

68.
Id. a t 490 (quoting Local 985, UAW v. W.M. Chace Co., 262 F. Supp. 114,
117 (E.D. Mich. 1966)).
Id.
69.
70.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 491.
71.
72.
646 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1981).
73.
Id. a t 266. The arbitrator ordered the employer to continue checking off
union dues "upon receipt of proper authorization cards from the employees," thus
making the practice legal under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
186(c)(4) (providing that if the employer has received written consent from the
employees, i t may check off union dues). The award, therefore, mandated nc affirmative conduct in violation of federal statutes but was based on a n illegal contract. 646 F.2d at 266.
74.
646 F.2d a t 266. See 29 U.S.C. $ 186(a)(l) (1988).
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legislation so provides" and concluded that "one who has himself participated in a n illegal act cannot be permitted to assert
in a court of justice any right founded upon or growing out of
the illegal t r a n s a ~ t i o n . "Relying
~~
on the "strong presumption
that agreements in violation of a statute" are void,76the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur of the award.77
The third category of illegality cases involves arbitration
awards that compel a violation of the law. For example, i n
General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard
Brands, Inc. ,78the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce a n arbitration award that required the defendant employer to benefit one
group of employees a t the expense of a second group because
such action constituted an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act.7g In a similar case, a federal district court vacated a n arbitration award that allowed the employer to compel its employees to operate vehicles that did not
conform to certain provisions of the state vehicle code."

C. Analysis
The need for the illegality standard of review is obvious. As
discussed earlier, federal courts are powerless to vacate arbitration awards under the manifest disregard of the law standard. Were courts forced to rely on its strict application, none
of the above awards would have been vacated because the arbitrators often did not state their reasons for the award, and in
cases where they did, they manifested no intention to disregard
the law. Analysis of the three categories of illegality cases
makes it even more apparent that the illegality standard of
review is needed to check arbitration decisions. The first category of cases, where the arbitrator applies a n incorrect legal
standard, seems most suspect. The Supreme Court has conclu75.
646 F.2d at 267.
76.
Id. at 266.
77.
Id. at 268.
78.
579 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 957 (1979). Another
example is found in Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 520, Int'l Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
79.
579 F.2d at 1286.
80.
Local Union 249, General Teamsters v. Consolidated Freightways, 464 F.
Supp. 346, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1979). In another case, the Fourth Circuit held unenforceable an arbitration award that required the employer to negotiate with a
union that at the time of the enforcement adion no longer represented the employees, having been decertified one week after the award was issued. Glendale Mfg.
Co., 283 F.2d at 937-38.

sively held that federal courts do not sit to reverse arbitrators'
errors in legal interpretation?' Broadway Cab and Carte
Blanche vacated arbitration awards where the arbitrator applied incorrect legal standards because the legal error violated
the law and public policy. This rationale seems inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's present mandate. Either the courts
simply erred or a real difference exists between mere legal
error and legal error sufficiently egregious to actually violate
law and public policy. But of course, any legal error, by definition, violates the law. The obvious difficulties with this distinction show that the cases may well have been incorrectly decided.
The second category of cases, where the underlying contract is illegal, more clearly demonstrates the need for judicial
review. Regardless of how the arbitral process is characterized,
one party ultimately presents a contract in a court of law for
enforcement, It stands to reason, therefore, that the court
should have the last say regarding the contract's validity. If the
contract is illegal before arbitration, the arbitral process does
not somehow legitimize the contract. Federal courts have the
ultimate authority and responsibility to determine the legality
of contracts presented for enforcement, whether directly in the
context of a civil action, or indirectly, in the context of arbitration awards. The arbitration process, even with its favorable
underlying federal policy, does not diminish this responsibility.
To give blind deference to arbitration awards in such cases is
inappropriate because i t may allow parties to avoid the law by
resorting to a r b i t r a t i ~ n . ~ ~
Cases in the last category, in which the award compels a
violation of the law, offer the clearest rationale for the illegality
standard of review. Because federal courts have the ultimate
responsibility for enforcing the law, any arbitration award that
on its face compels conduct in violation of the law deserves no
deference and should be per se invalid.

81. See cases cited supra note 58.
82.
Consider the following example. Suppose A and B enter into a contract,
which contains an arbitration clause, to wager on the outcome of the World Series,
an illegal agreement under state law. ARer the event, a dispute arises over the
contracted point spread and the agreement is submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator rules in favor of B, who then presents the award in federal court for enforcement. Deference to this award would be inappropriate.
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A. Historical Background
The development of the public policy standard can be
.~~
traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Hurd u. H ~ d g e In
Hurd, the Court held that federal courts' power to enforce private agreements was subject to the "limitations of the public
policy of the United States as manifested in Constitutions,
treaties, federal statutes and applicable legal precedent^."^^
Although Hurd did not specifically deal with arbitration
awards, its language appeared sufficiently broad to encompass
such cases.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the public
policy exception to arbitration awards in W.R. Grace & Co. u.
Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber Worke r ~ Grace
. ~ ~ had entered into a voluntary conciliation agreement with the Equal Opportunity Employment Board. The
agreement, however, conflicted with seniority provisions of the
employer's collective bargaining agreement with the union.g7
Later, during a strike, the employer honored the conciliation
agreement, thereby violating the collective bargaining agreement with the union?
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the union
filed a grievance with an arbitrator, who determined that,
although Grace acted in good faith in honoring the conciliation
agreement, it nevertheless violated the collective bargaining
agreement?' Grace then filed suit to vacate the award on the
ground that it violated public policies encouraging both obe-

83. For an excellent study of the public policy exception to judicial deference to
arbitration awards, see Amanda J. Berlowe, Comment, Judicial Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace in the Search for a WellL. REV.767 (1988).
Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U . MIAMI
84. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). In Hurd, property owners sued to enforce property covenants barring the sale of real property in the neighborhood to blacks. Id. at 2627. The court held that federal courts' power to enforce private agreements was restricted by public policy. Id. a t 34-35.The Court refused to enforce the contract
because it violated public policy. No statutory basis for the decision existed because
the Fair Housing Act did not exist a t the time of this decision.
85. Id. a t 35.
86. 461 U.S.757 (1983).
87. Id. a t 760.
88. Id. a t 760-61.
89. Id. a t 763-64.
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dience to court ordersg0and voluntary compliance with Title
VII.gl On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded:
As with any contract, . . . a couj may not enforce a
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public
policy. . . . [Tlhe question of public policy is ultimately one for
resolution by the courts. If the contract as interpreted [by the
arbitrator3 violates some explicit public policy, we are obliged
to refrain from enforcing it. Such a public policy, however,
must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained
"by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests."g2

Application of this standard, however, proved to be difficult
and the Supreme Court again addressed the issue four years
later in United Paperworkers International Union u. Misco,
I ~ C
There,
. ~an
~ employee who operated dangerous machinery
was fired after police arrested him for possession of illicit
drugs.94The union filed a grievance and the arbitrator reinstated the employee, finding that the employer had no just
The district court vacated the award
cause for the di~charge.'~
and the court of appeals &rmed, ruling that reinstatement of
the employee violated the public policy "against the operation
of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.y796
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of
appeals based its judgment not on the existing Yaws and legal
precedents," but rather on "general considerations of supposed
public interest^."^' The Court was careful to note that although its W.R. Grace decision held that a court may refuse to
enforce an arbitration award that violates public policy, it did
not "sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration

90.
A federal district court had ordered Grace and the union to abide by the
conciliation agreement. Id. at 761. Grace argued that the arbitration award was a
disincentive to obey the court order. Id. at 767.
Id. at 770-71.
91.
Id. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U S . 49, 66 (1945))
92.
(citations omitted).
93.
484 U.S.29 (1987).
94. Id. at 32-33. Police found the employee in the company parking lot "in the
back seat of this car with marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted marijuana
cigarette in the front seat ashtray." Id. at 33.
Id. at 33-34.
95.
Id. at 35.
96.
97.
Id. at 44.
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Thus, the exception is limawards as against public
ited to situations where "the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedent^."^^ Moreover, "no violation of that policy was
clearly shown in this case," for there was no showing that the
employee was actually operating machinery while under the i d u ence of drugs.'" "At the very least," the Court concluded, "an
alleged public policy must be properly framed under the approach set out in W.R. Gra~e."'~'
Despite this attempt to clarify the public policy exception,
the Court failed to address the issues "upon which the certiorari was granted," namely, "whether a court may refuse to enforce a n arbitration award only where the award itself violates
positive law or requires unlawful conduct" and whether the
public policy exception in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement is the same as in the context of a contract.lo2 Justice Blackmun noted that these "issues are left for another
day."lo3

B. Application
Until Justice Blackmun's day comes, considerable uncertainty remains in the federal circuit courts regardbg the proper scope of the public policy exception.lo4In light of the policy
of judicial deference to arbitration awards, several federal circuits hold that the award must actually compel a violation of
positive law to meet the public policy exception. For example,
in American Postal Workers Union v, United States Postal Service,'05 the D.C. Circuit refused to vacate a n arbitration
award reinstating a discharged postal worker. The employee
had admitted to converting government funds and was fired.
After acquittal on criminal charges, an arbitrator reinstated

98.
Id. at 43.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
99.
Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983), and
quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
Id. at 44.
100.
Id. at 43.
101.
102.
Id. at 46 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id.
103.
104.
Virtually all of the public policy exception cases involve labor arbitration
awards where an employee has been reinstated.
105.
789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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the employee, finding that no just cause existed for his dismissa1.'06 The district court vacated the award, not because it
violated law or public policy, but because the court substituted
its interpretation of the contract for that of the arbitrator.'''
Although the D.C. Circuit did not have to reach the issue,
it reversed because the award itself compelled no violation of
the law.'08 In short, the court stated that "an award will not
be vacated even though the arbitrator may have made, in the
eyes of judges, errors of fact and law unless it 'compels a violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted public p~licy.'"''~
The court noted that there is "no legal proscription against the
reinstatement of a person such as the grievant. And the award
did not otherwise have the effect of mandating any illegal cond ~ c t . " " ~The court implied, in effect, that the public policy
exception refers only to the public policy against enforcing
awards that by their terms compel a party to violate a positive
law.
The Ninth Circuit, en banc, has followed suit. In Stead
Motors u. Automotive Machinists Lodge 1173,"' a mechanic
was discharged after he failed to properly secure the front tire
of a client's a~tornobile.'~~
The arbitrator ordered the employ-

Id. a t 3. The arbitrator based his finding on an arguably erroneous inter106.
pretation of the Miranda warning requirements. Id. a t 3-4. The circuit court,
however, noted that mere legal errors by arbitrators were not subject to judicial
review. Id. a t 7.
107.
Id. a t 4.
108.
From the facts of the case, it seems clear enough that the circuit court
could have reversed because the district court reinterpreted the contract, an action
clearly forbidden by the Supreme Court. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (holding that courts should refuse to "review the merits of an arbitration award").
109. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d a t 7 (quoting Gulf States Tel. Co. v.
Local 1692, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1969)). See
also Washington-Hyphen Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442
F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
110. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 8. The D.C. Circuit continues to
follow this standard. See, e.g., United States Postal Sew. v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to vacate an
arbitration award because it does not compel a violation of the law), cert. granted,
484 US. 984 (1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988); see also E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 620 (7th Cir.)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("[tlhe question is whether the contract, as construed,
violates positive law"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986).
111. 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990).
112.
Id. a t 1202. The court noted that in 1984 the employee received a "warning
notice for failing properly to tighten the lug bolts on the wheels of a car he had
serviced." In 1985, after a dispute, the employee "was advised" that his foreman
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ee to be reinstated after 120 days suspension.113The plurality
rejected the employer's public policy arguments, holding that
"[ilf a court relies on public policy to vacate a n arbitral award
reinstating an employee, it must be a policy that bars reinstatement."l14 In other words, the award must compel a violation
of law or conduct contrary to accepted public policy.l15
Judge Trott's dissenting opinion fairly represents the contrary views of other circuits. Judge Trott took issue with the
fact that the employee was, reinstated "to the same position
from which he was fired," and refused to accept the plurality's
characterization of the case as a mere " 'reinstatement' of a n
errant empl~yee.""~Rather, he noted that the job requires
skill and care, as "unsafe cars injure and kill."l17 The concern
was obviously for the welfare of the public, a group not represented in this private transaction. 118
Judge Trott agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's characterization of the public policy exception in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n International.llg In Delta, a pilot was reinstated by a n arbitration panel after being discharged for operating a passenger airliner while under the influence of alcoThe circuit court vacated the award because it violated
h01.l~~
public policy. The court stated:
Misco requires the finding of a well defmed public policy and
an award that conflicts with t h a t policy. The public policy of
had " 'absolute authority' over matters such as proper lug bolt tightening procedures." The incident complained of occurred one month later. Id.
113.
Id. at 1203.
114. Id. a t 1212. The employer argued that the reinstatement violated two provisions in the California Vehicle Code, which prohibited operation of unsafe vehicles, and he indicated that Stead Motors' certification may be revoked because of
the incident. Id. at 1204.
Judge Wallace, joined by three others, thought that the plurality should not
have reached the issue. Id. a t 1224-25 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
115. Among others, the Sixth Circuit has also joined in this reasoning. See Interstate Brands Corp. v. Chauffeurs Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 893 (6th Cir.
1990) ("The issue is not whether grievant's conduct for which he was disciplined
violated some public policy or law, but rather whether the award requiring the
reinstatement of a grievance . . . violated some explicit public policy."), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1104 (1991).
116. Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1218-19 (Trott, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Judge Trott warned Stead Motors' customers, as well as county residents,
to keep their seat belts fastened. Id. a t 1218.
119.
861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.891 (1989).
120.
Id. a t 667-68.

780

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

which the Supreme Court speaks in Misco seems to be a public policy not addressing the disfavored conduct, in the abstract, but disfavored conduct which is integral to the performance of employment duties. The question we are instructed,
by Misco, to ask is not "Is there a public policy against the
employee's conduct?",but, rather, "Does an established public
policy condemn the performance of employment activities in
the manner engaged in by the employee?"121

After citing a myriad of statutes, rules, and regulations that
clearly prohibited the operation of aircraft while under the
influence of
the circuit court explained that when
an employee, in performing his duties, violates such clearly
established laws and regulations, "a requirement that the employer suffer that malperformance and not discharge the offender does itself violate the same well established public policy."123
Judge Trott also agreed with the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, International Brotherhood of Electrical workers .Iz4 In Iowa Electric,
a nuclear power plant machinist, in a hurry to leave for lunch,
breached the plant's security system, which was designed-t o
protect the public from harmful radiation.125 He was discharged but later reinstated by an arbitrator. The circuit court
affirmed the vacatur of the arbitration decision, concluding that
it violated the well defined public policy requiring strict adherence to federal nuclear safety regulation^.'^^ The court distinguished Misco in part because the safety rules in that case
were designed to protect other employees whereas the present
safety regulations were fashioned to protect the public as
127

Judge Trott noted that under the standard adopted by the
Ninth Circuit, limiting the public policy standard to situations
where the award compels a violation of the law, neither Iowa
Electric nor Delta would have qualified for judicial review. Such
a restriction "chokes the 'public policy' exception . . . into obli~ion."'~~
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672-73.
Id. at 674.
834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1426.
Id. at 1427.
Id. at 1427 n.2.
Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1221 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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C. Analysis
The number of cases in which the award actually compels
a violation of a positive law is extremely limited. Yet that is
what is often required to qualify for the public policy exception.
This requirement unnecessarily limits the otherwise viable
exception and ignores its underlying policy.
Misco expressly recognized that the underlying policy for
the exception is that federal courts ultimately represent the
interests of the public, who would otherwise be unrepresented
in the private action before the court.12' With this in mind,
Judge Trott's arguments make sense. Noting that the restrictive standard requires a showing that the "award itself clearly
violates a statutory prohibition," Judge Trott recognized that
the "magic word 'reinstatement' " would preclude federal courts
from vacating any arbitration award, no matter how egregious
the "totality of facts and circumstance^."^^^ Judge Trott provided the following example. Suppose that a reckless or malicious lab technician were to introduce AIDS-contaminated
blood into the nation's blood supply. This transaction would be
"beyond the reach of the law in this circuit if a non-lawyer
arbitrator, beholden to no one other than the parties to the
contract in question, decided to" reinstate the employee.13' He
continued:
If an arbitrator uses the word "reinstatement," the federal
courts in this circuit are now next to helpless to do anything

The Second and Third Circuits have joined with the reasoning that supports a
more broad application of the public policy exception. In Newsday, Inc. v. Long
Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's vacatur of an arbitration award reinstating an employee after the arbitrator found that the employee had committed sexual harassment
more than once. The arbitrator had decided that discharge was too severe a
penalty for the present stage of the employee's disease. The circuit court agreed
with the district judge's reasoning that the well-defined policy against sexual harassment a t the workplace "is subverted when an employer is required to reinstate
a n employee who is a chronic sexual harasser." Id.
In a similar case, Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 91-5261, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15559, a t *17-*18 (3d
Cir. June 29, 1992), the Third Circuit upheld the district court's vacatur of an
arbitration award "which fully reinstate[d] an employee accused of sexual harassment without a determination that the harassment did not occur" because the
award violated public policy.
129. Misco, 484 U.S. a t 42.
130.
Stead Motors, 886 F.2d 1200, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1989) (Trott, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1224 (emphasis added).
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about it. A new form of kryptonite has been invented that
renders us impotent to vindicate the public interest in health
and safety. What amounts to a general policy favoring [arbitration] . . . now trumps the public policy exception . . . .IS2

In short, the requirement that the award compel a violation of a positive law robs the public policy exception of all its
substance. As the Supreme Court noted in Misco and Grace,
the asserted public policy must be "well defined and dominant"
and determined by reference to the laws and legal precedents
of the land.133In the context of labor arbitration, there are
simply no well defined and dominant laws against reinstatement when the employee's conduct is not considered. In the
context of commercial arbitration, there is simply no well defined and dominant law against, for example, awarding a sum
of money pursuant to a contract where the validity of the underlying contract is not considered.
Furthermore, whether a public policy is well defined and
dominant is determined by reference to the laws and legal
precedents of the land. Therefore, if an award compels a violation of a positive law, then undoubtedly the illegality standard
would apply and the so-called public policy exception is left
with no separate life of its own.134But even if that were not
enough, there can be little doubt that if a n arbitrator were to
order a party to violate a well defined and dominant law, the
award could be vacated on one of the statutory g r 0 ~ n d s . l ~ ~
Finally, a restrictive positive law test is wholly a t odds
with the underlying purpose of the public policy exception,
especially in cases where the health and welfare of large numbers of people are a t risk. Thus, as Judge Trott noted, "[a]
somewhat broader more rational approach grounded on analys i s a n d informed judgment-confined
by 'law a n d
precedent'-makes more sense in that it gives life to the public

132. Id.
133. See Misco 484 U.S. a t 44.
134. See supra part IV. The illegality ground is supported by the policy that no
court of law will lend its aid to any party in committing an illegal or immoral act
and therefore should govern situations where a n award compels a violation of the
law. See Mkco, 484 U.S. a t 42.
135.
See 9 U.S.C.A. 3 10(a)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1992), which provides that an arbitration award may be vacated on the grounds of "corruption, fraud," "evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators" or that the arbitrators "exceeded their
powers."
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policy exception rather than suffocating it beyond resuscitati~n."'~~
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress has established four statutory grounds upon
which an arbitration award may be vacated.13? The federal
judiciary has created four additional standards of review for
the vacatur of arbitration awards: (1)essence of the contract,
( 2 ) manifest disregard of the law, (3) illegality, and (4) public
policy. Most federal courts urge that these judicially created
standards of review be applied narrowly in order to support the
federal policy favoring arbitration, but many of the standards
are currently interpreted so strictly that the judiciary actually
undermines the validity of arbitration.
Arbitration is no panacea. It cannot replace the courts,
which are ultimately responsible for enforcing the laws of the
land and safeguarding the unrepresented public. The arbitrator, often a non-lawyer, is merely a contract-reader. She is
entirely beholden t o the parties and their contract. While the
judiciary should generally defer to the merits of a n arbitration
award, federal courts should not abdicate their essential role of
enforcing the laws of the land and representing the public.
Therefore, the federal judiciary should discard its present formalistic approach and adopt "[a] somewhat broader more rational approach grounded on analysis and informed judgment."'" A more reasonable standard of review may empowe r federal courts to vacate arbitration awards (1)when there is
evidence that the arbitrator has disregarded the law, without
requiring an express showing on the record of the arbitrator's
intent to disregard the law; (2) when either the award itself or
the underlying contract being interpreted is illegal; or (3) when
the events underlying the arbitration award violate public
policy, not only when the award itself strictly compels a violation of the law.

Bret F. Randall

136.
137.
138.

Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1222 (Trott, J., dissenting).
See supra note 4.
Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1222 (Trott, J., dissenting).

